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Antitrust: Consumer Standing After Reiter v.
Sonotone Corp. and Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois
INTRODUCTION

The federal antitrust laws' authorize a private cause of action
for treble damages b. "any person" who sustains an injury to
"business or property"2 by reason of an antitrust violation. Specifically, the Clayton Act" authorizes the award of treble damages in
1. "The antitrust laws" are defined by Section One of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12,
and include four statutes: the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976); the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976); the Wilson Tariff Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 8-11 (1976); and the act amending the Wilson Tariff Act, 15 U.S.C. § 11 (1976). There are at least 67 other federal statutes
containing antitrust provisions to which Section Four does not apply. Nashville Milk Co. v.
Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373, 376 & n.4 (1958). For example, Section One of the RobinsonPatman Act amended Section Two of the Clayton Act to make it unlawful for any person
engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, to discriminate in price, services, or
facilities, where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition
or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a). Since this section
amended the Clayton Act, Section One of the Robinson-Patman Act is an "antitrust law" as
defined by Section One of the Clayton Act and a private cause of action does lie for violations. On the other hand, Section Three of the Robinson-Patman Act does not amend the
Clayton Act and no private cause of action is authorized by the Clayton Act. Section Three
authorizes criminal sanctions for particular discriminatory acts. First, discrimination in discounts and charges are illegal when knowingly not made available by the seller to competitors of the purchaser. Second and third, geographic price discrimination and unreasonably
low prices are illegal when made for the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a
competitor. 15 U.S.C. § 13a. Although price discrimination is both criminally punishable
under Section Three of the Robinson-Patman Act and subject to a private cause of action
under Section Two of the Clayton Act, selling "at unreasonably low prices for the purpose of
destroying competition or eliminating a competitor" is subject only to criminal sanctions
provided by Section Three of the Robinson-Patman Act and no private cause of action is
available.
2. See note 6 infra for a discussion of the meaning of the terms "business or property."
3. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). The Sherman Act, Ch. 647, §§ 1-7, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current
version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976)), was passed in response to political pressures from farmers and the general public who demanded some control over the "trust-builders" who owned
the railroads and operated the "trusts" or monopolies in many consumer-goods industries.
It was the widespread belief that these "trusts" forced out smaller competitors by unfair
practices and then proceeded to raise prices for consumer goods. Because of the characteristically inelastic demand for such goods, the "trust-builders" were accused of reaping huge
profits at the expense of the consumer. The two major political parties reacted to the public
outcry in 1888 and constructed platforms with anti-monopoly planks. The new Congress
enacted the Sherman Act of 1890. See A. NATE, THE ANTrrSUST LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 23-28 (1960). The Sherman Act, in general terms, prohibits both unreasonable restraints upon and monopolization of trade and is comprehensive in nature. See
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cases when three elements are proven. The plaintiff must establish
a violation of the antitrust laws, a resulting injury to business or
property, and damages.4 Regardless of the type of antitrust plaintiff, the antitrust violation and resulting damages are invariably
contested issues in the litigation.5 Consumer plaintiffs, though,
have a unique burden in proving injury to business or property,
because many courts have held that only direct purchasers with
business or commercial property losses can bring an antitrust action.' Since consumers ordinarily do not purchase goods directly
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975). The Act provides for both civil and
criminal remedies. The Justice Department has the duty to bring either criminal prosecutions or civil suits in equity to enjoin and prevent violations of the Sherman Act, or both. 15
U.S.C. § 4 (1976).
The Clayton Act, Ch. 323, §§ 12-27, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §
15 (1976)), was passed to supplement the Sherman Act. It provides an enumeration of specific trade practices which, under certain circumstances, were declared illegal as Sherman
Act violations. J. VAN CISE, UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST LAWS 20-25 (1976). The Act now
provides for civil remedies. The Justice Department has the duty to institute equity proceedings to prevent and restrain violations of the Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1976).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 15, provides:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the
United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an
agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold
the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
See generally E. TIMBERLAKE, FEDERAL TREBLE DAMAGE ANTITRUST ACIONS (1965) [hereinafter cited as TIMBERLAKE]; J. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE RzGULATION
(1979); Rogers, Antitrust: Criminal Intent in Antitrust Prosecutions, Collateral Estoppel
and Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act, and the Relationship of Standing and Injury in Private Antitrust Suits, 56 CHICAGO-KENT L. REv. 45 (1980). Professor Rogers notes that although the courts could have construed "by reason of" literally and required only factual
causation between violation and injury, instead the courts have limited the scope of Section
Four by requiring legal causation for standing as well. Two tests have been adopted by
various courts. The direct injury test requires privity between the plaintiff and defendant,
while the target area test requires that plaintiff's injury occur within the sector of the economy that the defendant's conduct allegedly affected. Id. at 60-61.
15 U.S.C. § 16, provides:
A final judgement or decree heretofore or hereafter rendered in any civil or criminal proceeding brought by or on behalf of the United States under the antitrust
laws to the effect that a defendant has violated said laws shall be prima facie
evidence against such defendant in any action or proceeding brought by any other
party against such defendant under said laws . . . as to all matters respecting
which said judgement or decree would be an estoppel as between the parties
thereto: Provided, that this Section shall not apply to consent judgements or decrees entered before any testimony has been taken . ...
5. These topics are beyond the scope of this article. See generally L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST (1977) [hereinafter cited as SULLIVAN).
6. A person's "business or property" is not defined in the Clayton Act. The phrase, however, has been subject to various judicial interpretations. There is a general consensus that
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from a manufacturer 7 nor sustain a business or commercial property loss as a result of their purchase, many have been precluded
from recovery under the Clayton Act.
In two recent cases, though, the Supreme Court was presented
issues having a direct impact upon a consumer's right to sue under
the antitrust provisions. In Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,8 the Court
firmly endorsed the requirement that an antitrust plaintiff must be
a direct purchaser from the alleged violator. More recently, in Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.,9 the Court held that a consumer can bring

"business" includes both a commercial enterprise (see Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S.

251 (1972);

TIMBERLAKE,

supra note 4, at 20-23;

SULLIVAN,

supra note 5, at 770-73) and a

person's employment (see Nichols v. Spencer Int'l Press, Inc., 371 F.2d 332, 335 (7th Cir.
1967); Hoopes v. Union Oil Co., 374 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1967); TIMBERLAKE, supra note 4, at
20-21; SULLIVAN, supra note 5, at 770-71). The meaning of "property", however, has been
the subject of dispute. Some courts have held that "property" refers only to business property and, thus, that consumers lack standing to recover for non-business injuries. Under
such rationale, recovery is allowed only for competitive injuries. See, Peller v. International
Boxing Club, 227 F.2d 593 (7th Cir. 1955); Roseland v. Phister Mfg. Co., 125 F.2d 417 (7th
Cir. 1942); Young v. Colonial Oil Co., 451 F. Supp. 360 (M.D. Ga. 1978); Weinberg v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 880 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Smith v. Toyota Motor Sales,
U.S.A., Inc., 1977-1 Trade Cas. 61,251 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Gutierrez v. E. & J. Gallo Winery
Co., 425 F. Supp. 1221 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Hamman v. United States, 267 F. Supp. 420 (D.
Mont. 1967); Broadcasters, Inc. v. Morristown Broadcasting Corp., 185 F. Supp. 641 (D.N.J.
1960); Image & Sound Service Corp. v. Altec Service Corp., 148 F. Supp. 237 (D. Mass.
1956); Brownlee v. Malco Theatres, 99 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Ark. 1951); SULLIVAN, supra note
5, at 771-72 n.3. Other courts have held that "property" is to be given its common and
ordinary meaning of anything owned of value. See Bravman v. Bassett Furn. Indus., Inc.,
552 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1977); Croman Co. v. Nuclear Materials & Equip. Corp., 543 F.2d 501
(3d Cir. 1975); In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, 528 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1975); In re Hotel
Telephone Charges, 500 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1974); Waldron v. British Petroleum Co., 231 F.
Supp. 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Utah Gas Pipelines Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 233 F.
Supp. 955 (D. Utah 1964); SULLIVAN, supra note 5, at 771 n.3. Such an interpretation permits consumers to sue for treble damages under the antitrust laws. See De Gregorio v. Segal,
443 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1978); In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum
Products Antitrust Litigation, 1977-2 Trade Cas. 161, 639 (C.D. Cal. 1978). The interpretation of "property" became the subject for the Supreme Court's decision in Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., -U.S.-, 99 S. Ct. 2326 (1979). See text accompanying notes 47 through 68,
infra. Previously, the specific question of consumer standing under Section Four had not
been definitely answered by the Supreme Court. Justice Holmes, however, defined "injury to
his property" as "a person whose property is diminished by a payment of money wrongfully
induced." Chattanooga Foundry and Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 396
(1906). Some courts since then have assumed that noncommercial consumers have standing
to sue for treble damages under Section Four without discussion. See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 775-780 (1975) (Court assumed that purchasers of homes had
standing to sue for treble damages).
7. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 748-49 (1977) (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, J.J., dissenting).
8. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
9. -U.S.-, 99 S. Ct. 2326 (1979).

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 11

an antitrust action even though the resulting injury to property is
not a business or commercial loss.' 0 The result of the two decisions
seems to be that a consumer now has standing to sue because of
his private property injury, but that he is precluded from recovery
because he is not a direct purchaser. Although the two holdings are
not in themselves contradictory, a comparison of the two decisions
reveals that the Court took diametrically opposed approaches in
deciding each.11 Those glaring inconsistencies leave the future of
the consumer as antitrust plaintiff uncertain.
After an analysis of Illinois Brick and Reiter, this article will
consider the current status of the consumer-plaintiff under Section
Four of the Clayton Act. In addition, the alternative to the treble
damages remedy, injunctive relief, will be discussed. Finally, proposed remedial legislation will be considered in conjunction with
comments on the future of the antitrust consumer-plaintiff.
ILLINOIS BRICK CO. V. ILLINOIS

In Illinois Brick,12 the plaintiffs brought a suit for treble damages against eleven concrete block manufacturers for illegal pricefixing. 14 The concrete blocks had been sold originally to masonry
contractors, who in turn resold them to general contractors. 5 The
general contractors then sold the blocks to the plaintiffs." In this
chain of sales transactions, only the masonry contractor is considered a "direct" purchaser. All subsequent buyers are "indirect"
purchasers from the manufacturers. The Illinois Brick Company
argued that plaintiffs were not entitled to bring the action, because
recovery of treble damages under Section Four of the Clayton Act

10. Id. at -, 99 S. Ct. at 2332.
11. See text accompanying notes 69-86 infra.
12. 431 U.S. 720 (1977). See generally Note, An End to Recovery by Indirect Purchasers
Under Section Four of the Clayton Act, 42 ALBANY L. REV. 312 (1978); Note, Illinois Brick:
The Death Knell of Ultimate Consumer Antitrust Suits, 52 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 421 (1978);
Note, Illinois Brick: An Abuse of Precedent to Circumvent Intent, 1977 UTAH L. REV. 501
(1977); Note, Illinois Brick and Consumer Actions: The Passing Over of the Passing-On
Doctrine, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 361 (1978); Note, Scaling the Illinois Brick Wall: The Future
of Indirect Purchasersin Antitrust Litigation, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 309 (1978).
13. The plaintiffs were the State of Illinois and 700 local government entities.
14. 431 U.S. 720, 727 (1977).
15. Id. at 726.
16. Id. The state alleged that the manufacturers had engaged in price-fixing and had
conspired to inflate prices by $3 million on cement blocks used in public buildings. The
state also alleged that these overcharges were passed on to the plaintiffs through the chain
of distribution. Previously, the defendants had entered pleas of no contest to a criminal
indictment for price-fixing in violation of the Sherman Act and were then fined $19,850.
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is limited to "direct" purchasers. 7 The Supreme Court agreed with
the manufacturer. s
In reaching its decision, the Illinois Brick Court relied on the
"pass-on" rule enunciated in Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Machinery.19 Pass-on occurs when a purchaser of an overpriced product recoups his loss by reselling at a higher price to the next buyer.
The higher price, then, is passed on in the chain from manufacturer to ultimate consumer. Often, manufacturers charged with
price fixing would defensively assert that the direct purchaser lacked standing because he had passed on his economic loss. 20 However, the Hanover Shoe Court reasoned that to permit the pass-on
defense would deflate the potential power of the Clayton Act by
denying private plaintiffs standing to bring suit.2 1 Thus, the prohibition of the defense is designed to encourage private enforcement
actions under the Clayton Act.
Although the Illinois Brick Court considered its decision as an

17. Id. at 727.
18. Id. at 746-48. The district court had granted summary judgment for the defendants.
Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 67 F.R.D. 461 (N.D. Ill. 1975). The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the State was entitled to sue the manufacturers even
though it was an indirect purchaser. The court ruled that plaintiffs could recover if they
could prove that the overcharges were passed on to them through the distribution chain.
Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., Inc., 536 F.2d 1163, 1165-67 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 431 U.S.
720 (1977).
19. 392 U.S. 481 (1968). In Hanover Shoe, a manufacturer of shoe machinery was sued
under Section Four by one of its customers, a manufacturer of shoes, for monopolization in
violation of the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court unanimously held that the defendant
could not escape liability on the theory that plaintiff had passed on any increased cost to
consumers. Instead, the Court held that the direct purchasers could recover the full amount
of any overcharge.
20. This is called "defensive use" of passing on. "Defensive use" of passing on occurs
when the courts permit a defendant to prove as an affirmative defense that plaintiff has
passed on to others some or all of the illegal overcharge, and thus, the plaintiff may not
recover for any of the overcharge passed on. "Offensive use" occurs when a court permits a
plaintiff who is an indirect purchaser to recover if they can prove that part of an illegal
overcharge was passed on to them. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 724-30
(1977). Professor Sullivan has called the pass-on issue as presenting "the most complex
problems in antitrust enforcement." SULLIVAN, supra note 5, at 787. See generally Note,
Antitrust: The Offensive Use of Passing-On, 17 WASHBURN L. J. 374 (1978); Note, Antitrust
- Treble-Damage Action - Hanover Shoe Inc. Rule Bars Offensive Use of Passing-On Doctrine by Indirect Purchaser, 23 VILL. L. REV. 381 (1978); Note, Debate Over Passing-On
Concept in Antitrust Law: Is It Finally Settled?, 15 HouSTON L. REV. 199 (1977).
21. 392 U.S. at 494. The Hanover Shoe decision was based on two additional considerations: (1) the Court was unwilling to bring increased complexity to treble damage actions by
allowing attempts to prove passing on through extended chains of distribution, and (2) the
likelihood that few consumers would sue because of the small size of their individual claims.
Id. at 492-93.
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extension of the pass-on rule, the pro-enforcement spirit of Hanover Shoe was diminished by the Illinois Brick decision. The Illinois Brick Court aspired to rigid consistency in applying the passon rule. 22 It concluded that if pass-on is unavailable as a defense
for the manufacturer, then it should not be an available offensive
tool for the ultimate consumer.2 In addition, the Court held that
an indirect purchaser cannot be injured in "business or property. 1 24 Thus, the ultimate indirect purchasers, who are unable to
pass on overcharges, are denied a Clayton Act remedy. 5
22. 431 U.S. 720, 728 (1977).
23. Id. at 730.
24. "[W]e decline to abandon the construction given §4 in Hanover Shoe - that the
overcharged direct purchaser, and not others in the chain of manufacturer or distribution, is
the party 'injured in his business or property' within the meaning of the section.
Id. at
729.
25. The reasoning behind this result has been labeled by Professor Sullivan as a perversion of the Hanover Shoe pro-enforcement rationale. SULLIVAN, supra note 5, at 791.
The Illinois Brick Court did indicate, though, that the indirect purchaser doctrine would
not apply in two narrow situations. First, an exception would be made whenever a preexisting cost plus contract was involved. 431 U.S. at 735-36. Second, in a footnote the Court
created another exception for the situation in which a direct purchaser is controlled by its
supplier. Id. at 736 n. 16.
The Court carefully limits the first exception to situations where both the direct-purchaser middleman and his customer enter contracts in which the quantity is fixed and the
price is determined by adding to the actual cost of the product the profit based on a percentage of that cost. In such a situation, the purchaser is insulated from any decrease in its
sales as a result of attempting to pass on the overcharge because its customer is committed
to buying a fixed quantity regardless of price. Thus, the "effect of the overcharge is essentially determined in advance." Id. at 736. Obviously, this exception has little utility for indirect-purchaser consumers because it is highly unlikely that consumers will ever be able to
use it to avoid the indirect-purchaser doctrine since consumers do not enter "pre-existing
cost-plus contracts."
Compare Mid-West Paper Products Co. v. Continental Group Inc., 596 F.2d 573 (3d
Cir. 1979) (the cost-plus contract exception is restricted to situations in which there were
pre-existing, fixed-quantity, cost-plus contracts at every level of the distribution chain) with
In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 600 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1979) (a functional
equivalent to the cost-plus contract exception exists when a plaintiff alleges that there is
structural inelasticity of short term supply and rigid formula pricing by intermediaries).
The Illinois Brick Court delineated its second exception to the direct purchaser doctrine in footnote 16: "Another situation in which market forces have been superseded and
the pass-on defense might be permitted is where the direct purchaser is owned or controlled
by its customer." 431 U.S. 720, 736 n.16 (1977). The exception is intended to apply to a
situation in which free "market forces have been superseded" because one link in the distribution chain controls another link. This facilitates a determination of'whether a pass-on has
accrued. There are two cases cited in the footnote by the Court which involve situations in
which one level of the distribution chain was controlled by the preceding level. Although
lower courts have variously interpreted the meaning of this exception, the 'Majority interpret
the word "customer" to mean "supplier." Thus, the exception would apply for the indirect
purchaser where the defendant supplier controls the direct purchaser. See, e.g., Royal Printing Co. v. Kimberly Clark Corp., 621 F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1980); Mid-West Paper Products
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In a lengthy dissent to the Illinois Brick decision, three justices"
contended that the majority opinion was inconsistent with the dual
objectives of Section Four to compensate victims of antitrust violations and to deter future violators. 27 The dissenters determined
that the legislative history clearly indicates that Section Four was
designed as a remedy for all people, especially consumers.2 8 Thus,
the dissenters believe that the indirect purchaser rule contravenes
the clear intention of Congress and effectively forecloses the consumer from a Clayton Act remedy2 9 This is not only a perversion
of Hanover Shoe, the three justices claim, but a great injustice to
the consumer who is ultimately injured by an antitrust violation.8 0
REITER V. SONOTONE CORP.

In Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.,s1 the Supreme Court was presented
the issue of a consumer-plaintiff's standing to bring suit under Section Four in a slightly different context. The decision resolved a
long-standing conflict among lower federal courts.82 Several courts
had determined that a consumer was barred from a Clayton Act
remedy because he did not suffer a loss to "business or property"
as contemplated by Section Four of the Clayton Act. 8 Rejecting
the notion that property under the Act could only include business
property, the Court refused to impose the requirement that a consumer sustain a commercial loss. This decision to make a Section
Four remedy available to the consumer was premised upon many
Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573 (3d Cir. 1979); In re Sugar Industry Antitrust
Litigation (Slotter v. Amstar), 579 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1978); In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, 76 F.R.D. 460 (D. Conn. 1977); In re Toilet Seat Antitrust Litigation, 1977-2 Trade
Cas. 1 72,495 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
Even assuming that a consumer plaintiff did prove that a manufacturer controlled a
direct purchaser, the exception would not be available in many instances because many distributors or wholesalers sell to independent retail outlets or to other middlemen. Thus, consumers would still purchase from a middleman who is not "owned or controlled" by the
defendant manufacturer. The only way for a consumer to invoke the Illinois Brick exception
would be if the manufacturer owned each link in the distribution chain which sold the product to the consumer. A defendant manufacturer can avoid suit, however, by the simple expedient of adding an additional independent link to the distribution chain.
26. Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Marshall and Blackmun
concurred. Id. at 748.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 749.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 749-50, 753.
31. -U.S.-, 99 S. Ct. 2326 (1979).
32. See note 6 supra.
33. See note 6 supra.
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of the same compelling arguments found in the Illinois Brick
dissent."
The Lower Court Decisions
In May, 1975, Kathleen Reiter filed a class action suit against
five hearing aid manufacturers." The complaint alleged inter alia
that defendant manufacturers had engaged in vertical 6 and horizontal 37 price-fixing38 causing consumers to pay artificially high
prices for hearing aid products. 9 The defendants moved for dismissal or, alternatively, for summary judgment on the ground that
Reiter and all other consumer purchasers of the class had not been
injured in "business or property" as contemplated by Section Four
of the Clayton Act.4" The district court denied the motion and held
that if the purchasers could demonstrate antitrust violations
through price manipulation, then an injury to property had been
sustained under the Clayton Act. 1
Because the issue of consumer standing raised a controversial
and significant question of law, it was authorized for interlocutory
review by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. 42 That court
accepted the appeal and reversed the district court. 4' The Eighth
Circuit held that a consumer who did not sustain a competitive or
commercial injury to business br property lacked standing to sue
under the Clayton Act." the court reasoned that the Sherman and

34. See notes 26 through 30 supra and accompanying text.
35. -U.S.-, 99 S. Ct. 2326, 2329 (1979).
36. Vertical price-fixing entails illegal agreements between two members of a distribution chain. For example, agreements between a manufacturer and a retail dealer setting
minimum or maximum resale prices are vertical price restraints which are illegal under the
Sherman Act. See Albrecht v. The Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
37. Horizontal price-fixing involves agreements between two competitors to affect the
prices of the goods they are selling. See U.S. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
38. In particular, Reiter alleged that the manufacturers "restricted the territories, customers, and brands of hearing aids offered by their retail dealers. . . and conspired among
themselves and with their retail dealers to fix the retail prices of the hearing aids." Reiter v.
Sonotone Corp., -U.S.-, 99 S. Ct. 2326, 2329 n.1 (1979).
39. Id. at 2329.
40. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 435 F. Supp. 933, 934 (D. Minn. 1977), rev'd, 579 F.2d 1077
(8th Cir. 1978), rev'd, -U.S.-, 99 S. Ct. 2326 (1979).
41. 435 F. Supp. 933, 935-38.
42. Id. at 938.
43. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 579 F.2d 1077, 1078 (8th Cir. 1978). See Note, Consumer
Standing under Section 4 of the Clayton Act: Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 20 B.C. L. REv. 439
(1979); Note, Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.: Consumer Standing to Sue under Section 4 of the
Clayton Act, 43 ALBANY L. REV. 690 (1979).
44. 579 F.2d 1077, 1087 (8th Cir. 1978).
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Clayton Acts were intended to protect competitive enterprise and,
therefore, remedies under those statutes were primarily available
for businesses, not consumers.45 Upon petition, the Supreme Court
granted certiorarion the issue.'8
The Supreme Court Opinion
In an unanimous decision, the Reiter Court reversed the Eighth
Circuit.' Relying on legislative intent, canons of construction, and
prior decisions, the Reiter Court echoed the belief of the dissenting
justices in Illinois Brick that the protection of the antitrust laws
should extend to the consumer.' 8
The Court noted that Congress has never denied the consumer's
49
right to bring a treble damages action under the Clayton Act.
This absence of a specific exclusion was seen as evidence of an intent to extend the protection of the Act to individuals.5 0 In addition, after reviewing the legislative history, the Court determined
that the phrase "any person" has a "naturally broad and inclusive
meaning".5 " Similarly, it concluded the word "property" should
have a "broad and inclusive meaning", 52 encompassing the concept
of money as property. Thus, under the Court's interpretation, the
protection of Section Four is extended to any injury to property,
including a loss of money"3 resulting from artificially inflated

45. Id. at 1086.
46. -U.S.-, 99 S. Ct. 830 (1979).
47. -U.S.-, 99 S. Ct. 2326 (1979).
48. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 749 (1977) (Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun J.J., dissenting).
49. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., -U.S.-, 99 S. Ct. 2326, 2333 (1979).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 2330. Section One of the Clayton Act defines "person" to include corporations
and associations existing under or authorized by the laws of either the United States, the
laws of any of the Territories, the laws of any State, or the laws of any foreign country." 15
U.S.C. §§ 7, 12 (1976). Although this definition could have been narrowly interpreted by
allowing only corporations and associations to sue, the courts have construed it broadly and
have allowed many kinds of entities to sue. See Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S.
308 (1978) (foreign government); Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1965)
(individuals); Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159 (1942) (state); Coast v. Hunt Oil Co., 195 F.2d
870 (5th Cir. 1952) (partnership); Hoffman Motors v. Alpha Romea, 244 F. Supp. 70
(S.D.N.Y. 1965) (corporation); U.S. v. Brookman Co., 229 F. Supp. 862 (N.D. Cal. 1964)
(partnerships); City of Chicago v. Allen-Bradley Co., 32 F.R.D. 448 (N.D.Ill.
1963) (municipalities); United Brick & Clay Workers of Am. v. Robinson Clay Prods. Co., 64 F. Supp. 872
(N.D. Ohio 1946) (trade associations); but cf., Kauffman v. Dreyfus Fund, Inc., 434 F.2d 727
(3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971) (individuals); Athlete's Foot of Del. v.
Ralph Libonati Co., 1978-1 Trade Cas. 161, 827 at 73, 465-66 (D. Del. 1977) (individuals).
52. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., -U.S.-, 99 S. Ct. 2326, 2330 (1979).
53. Id. at 2330-32.
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prices.
In reaching this decision, the Court also followed the canons of
construction which suggest that the disjunctive phrase "business or
property" should be divided into two separate meaings." The
Court reasoned that every word of a statute must be given effect
unless the context demands otherwise, 5 and in this situation the
context does not so demand. Moreover, the Court noted that the
legislative record does not reflect the intended scope of these
words, 56 and there is no indication that the term business should
modify the word property.5 7 Thus, the Eighth Circuit had misconstrued the statute; the word property must be given meaning independent of the word business." The Court concluded that an injury to property can be a financial loss, but does not have to be a
commercial or competitive loss."
Additionally, the Reiter Court emphasized that its prior decisions have consistently supported the legislative intent of Congress.60 Previously, the Court had held that the Clayton Act is regarded as comprehensive protection for all victims of antitrust
violations. 1 Furthermore, the Court noted that it has regarded the
treble damages provision of the Clayton Act as an effective "door
of justice" 2 for every injured party. Thus, the Court reasoned that
permitting consumers to sue for money lost because of price-fixing
is wholly consistent with the prior decisions.6"
An Open Door for Consumers?
Despite the unequivocal language in Reiter that the property interests of consumers can and must be protected by the antitrust
laws," a lingering problem that remains for the injured consumer

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 2331.

Id.
Id. at 2333.
Id. at 2331.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2332.
Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 486 n.10 (1977).
99 S. Ct. at 2332.
Id. at 2332-33. The Reiter Court states:
Consumers in the United States purchase at retail more than $1.2 trillion in goods
and services annually. 1978 Economic Report of the President 257 (Table B-1). It
is in the sound commercial interests of the retail purchasers of goods and services
to obtain the lowest price possible within the framework of our competitive private enterprise system. The essence of the antitrust laws is to ensure fair price
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is the seemingly inconsistent Illinois Brick decision. The Reiter
Court did not consider the indirect purchaser rule of Illinois Brick
because that issue was not expressly raised on appeal. 65 Yet consumers in the United States rarely make purchases directly from
the manufacturer.16 Thus, Reiter grants a consumer standing to recover treble damages by virtue of her being injured in her property,6 7 but Illinois Brick requires that purchasers be direct purchasers in order to recover.66 Consequently, it appears that what
Reiter gives on the one hand, Illinois Brick takes away with the
other. This apparent contradiction is only emphasized and not discounted by an examination of the rationale of each case.
ANALYSIS OF Reiter and Illinois Brick: WERE THEY DECIDED BY
THE SAME COURT?

A close analysis of Illinois Brick fails to support the Reiter
Court's contention that it has interpreted the Clayton Act consistently.' Indeed, a careful reading of the two cases reveals that they
are diametrically opposed in approach and underlying theory. Illinois Brick abounds in concern that indirect-purchaser consumers
will plunge the Court into hopeless disarray. The Court feared that
actions by indirect purchasers would mushroom into massive
multi-party suits attacking every level of distribution.7 0 Furthercompetition in an open market. Here, where petitioner alleges a wrongful deprivation of her money because the price of the hearing aid she bought was artificially
inflated by reason of respondents' anticompetitive conduct, she has alleged an injury in her "property" under § 4.
Id. at 2332. The Court's language certainly implies that all consumers are to be protected
and not just direct-purchaser consumers of the defendant manufacturer. Indeed, the statistic cited by the Court ($1.2 trillion in consumer purchases) includes both direct and indirect
consumers. 1978 Economic Report of the President 257 (Table B-1). Thus, it is interesting
to note that the Court states, on the one hand, that all consumers need to be protected, but,
on the other hand, the Court knows that Illinois Brick precludes such protection.
65. Id. at 2330 n.3. The Reiter district court issued its memorandum order, as amended,
on May 10, 1977. The Illinois Brick Supreme Court issued its opinion on June 9, 1977.
66. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 748-49 (1977) (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, J.J., dissenting). A reader can quickly verify this statement by reviewing the purchases
he or she has made within the last year. A consumer cannot usually buy directly from a
manufacturer for two reasons:, (1) the manufacturer has an operating policy which provides
that sales will not be made to the public, or (2) the consumer cannot meet a "minimum
order" quantity that a manufacturer requires for any sales. One exception in which a consumer buys directly from the manufacturer, however, is when the manufacturer owns the
entire chain of distribution.
67. See text accompanying notes 69 through 72 supra.
68. 431 U.S. at 740.
69. See text accompanying notes 47 through 63 supra.
70. 431 U.S. at 729. Only "the overcharged direct purchaser, and not others in the chain
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more, the Court was apprehensive of large class action suits by ultimate consumers remote from the defendant.7 1 Hence, the Court
construed Section Four very narrowly. It limited recovery to the
overcharged direct purchaser by holding that only direct purchasers sustain an injury to business or property. The Court deliberately excluded other purchasers in the chain of distribution. 3
In contrast, the Reiter Court expressed little concern about
overburdened courts and the proverbial floodgates of litigation. 7
Similarly, the Court did not express alarm that small businesses
might be victimized by frivolous suits.7 4 In Illinois Brick these considerations dealt the deathblow to the indirect purchaser,5
whereas the Reiter decision merely calls upon district courts to
control these suits with the civil procedure rule governing class actions. 78 The Court reasoned that under Rule 23," frivolous suits
can be circumvented by denying class certification when it appears
consumers are abusing the judicial process by filing spurious treble
damage suits. 78 In addition, the Reiter Court called upon Congress
to deal with these administrative concerns."
A more fundamental difference between Illinois Brick and Reiter is a marked divergence in approach to statutory analysis in the
two cases. The Illinois Brick Court virtually ignored the statute
while developing the indirect purchaser doctrine. The Reiter
Court, however, relied almost exclusively upon the legislative history and principles of statutory construction. Consequently, the
Reiter Court determined that Section Four is to be interpreted
broadly, 0 a result inconsistent with the narrow approach of Illinois Brick.8 1

of manufacturer or distribution, is the party 'injured in his business or property.'" Id.
71. Id. at 740.
72. Id. at 729.
73. "To be sure, these private suits impose a heavy litigation burden on the federal
courts; it is the clear responsibility of Congress to provide the judicial resources necessary to
execute its mandates." 99 S. Ct. 2326, 2334 (1979).
74. Id. at 2334.
75. See text accompanying notes 12 through 30 supra.
76. 99 S. Ct. at 2334.
77. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
78. 99 S. Ct. at 2334.
79. Id. at 2333. "We must take the statute as we find it. Congress created the trebledamages remedy of § 4 precisely for the purpose of encouraging private challenges to antitrust violations." Id. at 2333. "(It is the clear responsibility of Congress to provide the
judicial resources necessary to execute its mandates." Id. at 2334.
80. See note 79 supra.
81. See notes 70 through 72 supra and accompanying text.
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Finally, as discussed, the Reiter Court determined that "business or property" should be given disjunctive meaning consistent
with canons of statutory construction and that the plain intent of
Congress was to give "property" independent significance.82 The
Court then held that a consumer's money is "property" within the
meaning of Section Four. 83 It is interesting to note, however, that
since the majority of consumers are indirect purchasers and precluded from suit under Illinois Brick, the Reiter Court's desire to
give credence to the statutory language of Section Four is negated
by the continued viability of Illinois Brick. "Property" loses its independent and disjunctive meaning when the only remaining
plaintiffs who can bring suit are direct purchasers, since they are
usually businesses. In effect, then, Illinois Brick causes "business"
to modify "property". 8 '
Since the Reiter Court refused to consider Illinois Brick, the status of the indirect purchaser consumer is not altogether clear. The
principles relied on in Reiter depart drastically from those of Illinois Brick. The Reiter Court, in powerful language, emphasized
that the consumer's right to sue for treble damages supersedes the
practical considerations which may accompany the granting of consumer standing. 85 This approach more closely parallels the approach of the dissenters in Illinois Brick - both consistently urge a
broad interpretation of the Act and insist that the consumer must
be afforded the full protection of the antitrust laws.
FUTURE OF THE ANTITRUST CONSUMER-PLAINTIFF

Because of the glaring inconsistencies in Illinois Brick and Reiter, it is possible that the Court will fully adopt the dissenting
analysis in Illinois Brick if given an opportunity. Until that time,
however, the consumer remains in a quandry and must rely on alternative remedies or hope for remedial action by Congress.
Other Remedies
In addition to treble damages, the Clayton Act affords the consumer injunctive relief. Section 1687 of the Act permits any person
to enjoin defendant manufacturers when violations of the antitrust
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

See text accompanying notes 54 through 58 supra.
See text accompanying note 53 supra.
But see text accompanying note 57 supra. P. N. MARUCCL
99 S. Ct. at 2333-34.
431 U.S. 720, 749 (1977). See text accompanying notes 26 through 30 supra.
15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976).
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laws threaten loss or damage to business or property.8 8 Recently,
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit allowed indirect purchasers of consumer bags to sue for Section 16 injunctive relief
over objections that Illinois Brick precluded the suit.8
The Third Circuit deemed Illinois Brick inapplicable for several
reasons. First, injunctive relief was not an issue before the Illinois
Brick Court and was never considered.9 0 Second, the Third Circuit
found the policy considerations in Illinois Brick to be totally inapplicable to injunctive relief. The injunctive remedy does not require an analysis of the pass-on of overcharges and there is no risk
of multiple liability. If a defendant manufacturer is enjoined, no
further relief will be necessary.9 1 Finally, the Third Circuit noted
that there is no need for a symmetrical application of the Hanover
Shoe rule to defendants and plaintiffs.' 2 Therefore, the court held
that the rationale denying an indirect purchaser monetary relief
under Section Four does not apply to injunctive relief under Sec9
tion 16. 3
Although indirect consumer-plaintiffs do have recourse to this
injunctive relief, the remedy does not act to take away the fruits of
a defendant's illegality. Thus, an indirect consumer will not be
compensated for past violations. Rather, the remedy acts in a prospective, prophylactic manner to prevent further violations. This

15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976) provides:
Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for and have
injunctive relief, in any court of the United States having jurisdiction over the
parties, against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws, ...
when and under the same conditions and principles as injunctive relief against
threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage is granted by. courts of
equity ...
Thus both preliminary and permanent injunctive relief may be granted. See Flood v. Kuhn,
309 F. Supp. 793 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aft'd, 443 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1971), afl'd, 407 U.S. 258
(1972).
89. Mid-West Paper Products Co. v. Continental Group, 596 F.2d 573 (3d Cir. 1979).
90. Id. at 592.
91. Id. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972), where the Court stated:
While the United States Government, the governments of each State, and any
individual threatened with injury by an antitrust violation may all sue for injunctive relief against violations of the antitrust laws, and while they may theoretically
do so simultaneously against the same persons for the same violations, the fact is
that one injunction is as effective as 100, and, concomitantly, that 100 injunctions
are no more effective than one.
Id. at 261.
92. 596 F.2d 596, 592-94.
93. Id. at 594. See also In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 600 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir.
1979).
88.
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relief might prove valuable to the consumer who purchases goods
indirectly from the defendant manufacturer on a regular basis. After an injunction is issued, the consumer will continually benefit
because she will purchase the goods at prices that are not artificially high.
Yet a significant drawback to the use of the injunction is that
plaintiffs and attorneys will hesitate to expend the great sums of
money needed to litigate the issue when there is no payoff of treble
damages. Hence, an injunction will probably only be sought by
"watchdog" consumer groups, who have the funds and the staff for
such efforts, or by a state through a parens patria action."
Proposed Legislation
Legislation5 has been introduced in both the United States Senate and House of Representatives that would enable consumers, as
indirect purchasers, to maintain a treble damages suit. Each bill
would amend Section Four of the Clayton Act. For example, the
Senate bills" reverses the Illinois Brick decision and would allow a
plaintiff to sue for treble damages when injured in his business or
property directly or indirectly by the defendant. In addition, the

94. Parens patria actions were created by Congress in 1976 and expressly provide that a
state may sue antitrust violators on behalf of their injured citizens. 15 U.S.C. §§ 15c-15H
(1976). Parens patria actions on behalf of indirect purchasers, however, may have been
eliminated by Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 734 n.14.
95. The inability of indirect purchasers to sue for antitrust violations has given rise to
proposed remedial legislation. The United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary recommended on May 8, 1979, a bill to amend Section Four of the Clayton Act to permit indirect
purchasers the right to sue for treble damages. S. 300, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). A similar
bill is being considered by the House. See generally Note, Recovery by Indirect Purchasers:
Illinois Brick and the CongressionalResponse, 39 U. Pirr. L. REv. 537 (1978); Note, Congressional Authorization of Indirect Purchaser Treble Damage Claims: the Illinois Brick
Wall Crumbles, 47 FORDHAM L. REv. 1025 (1979). See also Note, California Legislature
Steers the Antitrust Cart Right Off the Illinois Brick Road, 11 PAcIFIc L. J. 121 (1979).
96. S. 300, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), provides:
Sec. 41(1) In any action under sections 4, 4A, or 4C of the Clayton Act, the fact
that a person or the United States has not dealt directly with the defendant shall
not bar or otherwise limit recovery.
(2) In any action under section 4, 4A, or 4C of this Act, the defendant shall be
entitled to prove as partial or complete defense to a damage claim, in order to
avoid duplicative liability to it, that the plaintiff has passed on to others, who are
themselves entitled to recover under section 4, 4A or 4C of this Act, some or all of
what otherwise would constitute plaintiff's damage.
(3) In any class action under section 4 of this Act and Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and in any action under section 4 of this Act by or on
behalf of any government, the amount of the plaintiff's attorney's fee, if any, shall
be determined by the court. ...

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 11

"pass-on" defense, struck down by the Hanover Shoe Court, would
be available to defendants to prevent duplicative liability.9 7 The
pass-on defense would be unavailable, however, to defendants
when there are no indirect-purchaser plaintiffs. The proposed
amendment is forcefully sponsored by consumer groups, but is
strongly objected to by the business community, which wants to
limit treble damage liability. 8 If the proposed amendment is

97. Id.
98. See MINORITY REPORT OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY to accompany S. 300,
923 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 2 (July 19, 1979).
Professor Handler, who testified against the Illinois Brick reversal bill in the Senate Judiciary Committee and its Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee, takes the position that to
allow indirect purchasers to sue would hurt rather than help antitrust enforcement. A restoration of offensive use of passing-on would allow indirect purchasers the right to sue. The
defensive use of passing-on would, according to Handler, undermine suits by direct purchasers. Professor Handler contends that "direct purchasers have historically been the backbone
of private antitrust enforcement" and cites the Electrical Equipment, Aluminum Wire and
Cable, Brass Tube, Hanover Shoe, Grinnell, and Oil Jobber cases as support for this proposition. In addition, Professor Handler did a study of all antitrust suits pending before the
Southern District of New York after Illinois Brick was decided by the Supreme Court. Only
three out of 69 suits filed by purchasers of goods and services were indirect purchasers. If
this result is extrapolated nationwide, Professor Handler warns that a great majority of the
3,000-plus antitrust suits pending in federal courts could be undermined by the pass-on
defense. Handler, Antitrust-1978, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1363, 1425-7 (1978).
A problem with Professor Handler's statistics is that they do not present a complete picture. He cites decided cases and statistics that 66 of 69 pending cases in the Southern District are brought by direct purchasers in support of his proposition that direct purchasers
are the "backbone" of antitrust enforcement. One must remember that these cases are
pending after the Illinois Brick Court has decided that only direct purchasers can sue for
antitrust violations. The 69 suits do not reflect the indeterminable number of causes of action that were discouraged by the Supreme Court's explicit exclusion of indirect purchasers.
The statistics do not reflect the number of cases which were pending and quickly settled
after Illinois Brick. In addition, the initiation and eventual success of lawsuits by several
direct purchasers does not shed any light on the question of how much more effective antitrust enforcement would be if indirect consumers could sue. The fact remains that there are
many more indirect purchasers of a given defendant manufacturer than direct purchasers
and the sheer weight of numbers will increase the odds that an illegal antitrust practice will
be noticed and attacked. In addition, the fact that the pass-on defense will undermine the
total damages recovered by a direct-purchaser plaintiff should not make the antitrust enforcement less effective since the indirect purchasers will recover that which the direct purchasers formerly received even though the direct purchaser passed-on the overcharge.
One commentator lists a number of reasons why direct purchasers will not sue their suppliers. Sole source of supply, no losses to recover if entire overcharge was passed-on, high
costs of litigation, and a reluctance to open themselves to discovery which might uncover
antitrust violations are some of the reasons why direct purchasers do not sue. Note, Treble
Damages and the Indirect PurchaserProblem: Considerations for a Congressional Overturning of Illinois Brick, 39 OHIO ST. L. REv. 343, 371 n.142 (1978).
In Good v. Everett & Jennings, Inc., Civ. 77-3890-R (C.D. Cal.), the plaintiffs are suing a
wheelchair manufacturer for monopolization. Not one of the 2,000 direct purchasing distributors has joined the suit because the defendant controls 90 percent of the market and these
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passed, an indirect consumer would not need to fall within a narrow Illinois Brick exception."Nor would an indirect consumer
have to risk expensive litigation in hope that the Supreme Court
will overrule Illinois Brick with the pro-consumer language it
enunciated in Reiter. In addition, Reiter would take on even
greater significance if the amendment passes. The amendment,
when read in conjunction with Reiter, would assure the availability
of treble damages to all consumers, -direct and indirect, because
consumers are deemed to be injured in their property when they
pay artificially high prices. 100
CONCLUSION

The Illinois Brick decision created a rigid indirect purchaser
doctrine which effectively excludes the consumer from a Clayton
Act treble damages remedy. In contrast, the Reiter decision reflects the Court's adherence to a broad interpretation of the Act.
Reiter embraces the idea of the consumer as plaintiff by abrogating the business or commercial loss rule. Unfortunately, Reiter
may only be a Pyrrhic victory because the consumer must still
qualify as a direct purchaser under Illinois Brick. Even though the
consumer can alternatively sue for injunctive relief, this remedy
lacks any financial incentive and is not compensatory.
The Reiter Court echoed the consumer-oriented concerns of the
dissenters in Illinois Brick. Perhaps, when again confronted with
the indirect purchaser doctrine, the Court will reconsider this
harsh rule. Hopefully, the Court will re-emphasize its broad statumiddlemen have no alternate source of supply. Since they pass along the monopoly
overcharges to the plaintiff consumers, the middlemen are not injured. Illinois Brick does
not allow the only parties injured - the consumers - the right to sue. Hearings on S. 300
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 82-85 (1979).
Finally, there are several good reasons why a direct purchaser will not bring suit against a
defendant manufacturer. A large manufacturer has at least two weapons it can wield which
can give it a certain degree of control over a direct purchaser. First, its most effective
weapon is its control over the extension of a line of credit to purchasers. The availability of
credit is crucial to all but large established businesses especially during periods of low sales
and earnings. Since not only objective but subjective factors are used in determining a direct
purchaser's "credit-worthiness," a defendant manufacturer has total discretion as to
whether it will extend credit and how much credit it will extend. Second, the defendant
manufacturer can avail itself of its right under the Robinson-Patman Act to refuse to deal
with any given potential purchaser. This threat of a termination of the buyer-seller relationship also gives the supplier a degree of control which can discourage private actions by
direct puchasers.
99. See note 25 supra.
100. S. 300, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). See note 96 supra.
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tory interpretation in Reiter and fully endorse the indirect purchaser as plaintiff. In the alternative, a congressional mandate abrogating the Illinois Brick rule may be forthcoming. Until either
the Court or Congress responds, however, the consumer is effectively denied an antitrust remedy. Since the consumer ultimately
suffers the financial loss wrought by artificially high prices, the action by Court or Congress should not be long delayed.
JOHN

T. DOYLE

